



THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

JS

JCSM-112-68

21 February 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Increase of US Army Forces in Korea (U)

1. (S) Reference is made to:

a. JCSM-53-68, dated 25 January 1968, subject as above, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the ceiling for US Army forces in Korea be increased by 8,500 spaces.

b. Your memorandum, dated 1 February 1968, on the above subject, which stated that any increase to US Army forces in Korea must be justified by an analysis of the tasks now being performed.

c. Your memorandum, dated 6 February 1968, on the above subject, which provided baseline guidance for the analysis discussed in reference lb.

2. The analysis requested by reference lb is contained in Appendices A and B hereto. This analysis supports the proposed increase in the US Army ceiling in Korea which is required to permit US forces to deal with the North Korean campaign of infiltration along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and terrorism in South Korea. Since October 1966, there has been a marked increase in North Korean belligerency and hostile actions against ROK and US forces. The number and intensity of hostile actions have accelerated since mid-1967, culminating in the BLUE HOUSE incident on 21 January 1968 and in the seizure of the USS PUEBLO on 23 January 1968. Of even greater significance is the fact that the majority of reported DMZ incidents have occurred in the zone of the US 2d Infantry Division. Statistics are shown in Appendix A. These circumstances have produced additional tasks for all US Army units in Korea as follows:

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a. The US sector of the DMZ must be more fully and actively manned.

b. The many critical US Army installations in Korea must be given additional security personnel.

3. (●) The current authorized manning level of approximately 74 percent of full TO&E/TD for US Army units is insufficient to meet the manpower requirements of these added tasks.

a. One and one-half battalions of the US 7th Infantry Division have already been diverted from their primary mission as the 8th Army reserve in order to provide for the security of critical US Army installations. The present and foreseeable situation along the DMZ not only precludes further reallocation of manpower but, in all prudence, requires the immediate return of combat units to their primary mission.

b. Not only should combat units be freed for their primary mission, but the heightened possibility that they may have to perform their wartime mission necessitates restoring their strength to more nearly the level which experience has shown to be necessary for combat operations.

c. The above requirements are not altered by the support, at this time, of some 15,000 ROK personnel, 11,000 of whom are Korean augmentation to US Army (KATUSA) personnel integrated into US units. This latter number, plus the 8,500 personnel increase, would simply permit combat units to operate at near TO&E strength. Furthermore, KATUSA personnel cannot be used for the security of all critical US Army installations.

4. (●) With regard to the third paragraph of reference 1c, possible force structure increases are being studied separately. Appropriate recommendations and supporting rationale will be forwarded as soon as possible.


5. (●) The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that certain increases to US Army forces in Korea are essential now and, therefore, reaffirm the recommendation forwarded by reference 1a that the ceiling for US forces in Korea be increased by 8,500 spaces.

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The specific augmentations, with appropriate statements of justification, are shown in Appendix B. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will continue to review the situation and make recommendations, as appropriate, based upon further developments.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:


B. E. SPIVY
Lt. General, USA
Director, Joint Staff

Attachments

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APPENDICES A AND B

TO

JCSM-112-68

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APPENDIX A

KOREAN DEMILITARIZED ZONE INCIDENTS
AND AGENT ACTIONS

1. Since 1966, the North Koreans have carried out a campaign of increasingly frequent and violent incidents along the demilitarized zone (DMZ) and in the rear areas of South Korea. In 1965, there were 23 incidents serious enough to be characterized as firefights; in 1966, there were 19 firefights; in 1967, there were 123 firefights along the DMZ, along with 315 other incidents of less serious nature. Thus far in 1968, some 48 incidents have been reported.

2. Incidents along the DMZ in 1967 were accompanied by significant agent activity in the South Korean rear areas, resulting in 500 US and South Korean casualties and 228 North Koreans killed and 57 wounded (see Annex to Appendix A hereto). The year 1968 has already seen the most dramatic of all agent actions - the BLUE HOUSE incident.

3. Of even greater significance to US forces is the fact that, during 1967, some 75 percent of all incidents reported occurred in the zone of the US 2d Infantry Division. Even allowing for the fact that some incidents occurring in the ROK Army sectors of the DMZ are never reported, the weight of the evidence makes it clear that US forces, which man 18 miles along the 151-mile demarcation line, are subjected to the North Korean main effort. The reason for this is that the US sector lies astride the best infiltration terrain and provides the shortest route to Seoul through a more populated forward area; thus, it is a logical first choice as a North Korean infiltration route. The attack on the BLUE HOUSE was conducted by North Korean agents infiltrating through the US sector.

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX A
KOREAN DMZ INCIDENTS AND AGENT ACTIONS

YEAR	TYPE OF INCIDENT		TOTAL	LOSSES												
	Fire Fight	Counter Intrusion Fire Act of Harassment		US KIA	US WIA	ROK KIA	ROK WIA	ROK CIV	ROK WIA	ROK KIA	ROK GVT	ROK WIA	ROK KIA	ROK GVT	ROK WIA	ROK KIA
1965	23	11	42	0	3	13	9	16	4	3	4	3	4	0	0	0
1966	19	14	37	6	1	29	28	0	0	4	5	0	0	0	0	0
1967	123	297	438	16	63	73	165	1	3	0	0	0	89	2		
AGENT (Rear area)	N/A	N/A	124	0	2	42	64	13	29	8	21	139	55			
(In US 2d Div area alone)	(56)	(268)	(9)													
1968 (Thru 28 Jan)	(Total of 48 of all types, of which 43 occurred in 2nd US Inf Div Zone)			2	12	17	30						25	1		

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ANNEX TO APPENDIX B

INCREASE IN PERSONNEL CEILING
FOR EIGHTH US ARMY

- 1. General 1
 - a. The requirement for an increase in the personnel ceiling 2
 - for the Eighth US Army stems from two basic reasons. The 3
 - first is to improve US capability to cope with the sharp increase 4
 - in North Korean infiltration and sabotage tactics in the Republic 5
 - of Korea. The second is to improve and maintain a credible deter- 6
 - rent posture to cope with the enemy's increasing improvement in 7
 - conventional warfare capability. 8
 - b. The immediate concern is attack and sabotage by well- 9
 - trained North Korean infiltrators in up to platoon-size groups 10
 - on highly critical key installations within the rear areas. 11
 - Intelligence indicators point to greatly increased enemy infil- 12
 - tration and sabotage efforts this spring. Two special ammunition 13
 - depots, 12 maximum security areas, and 15 REDEYE storage sites 14
 - are especially sensitive key installations and are prime targets 15
 - for attack and sabotage. 16
 - c. From the broader viewpoint, indications are that North 17
 - Korea clearly has developed sizable unconventional warfare 18
 - capabilities and, in the event of a resumption of hostilities, 19
 - would likely combine large-scale guerrilla attacks with conven- 20
 - tional operations. 21
- 2. Group 1 - Personnel for 2d and 7th Infantry Divisions 22
 - a. Combat Operations 23
 - (1) Operational requirements have increased in all US units 24
 - in order to counter the North Korean actions along the demilit- 25
 - arized zone (DMZ) and in the interior of the Republic of 26
 - Korea (ROK). Actions that are being taken which require an 27
 - increase in the operational capability are as listed: 28

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- (a) Increased patrolling along the DMZ. 1
- (b) Increased number of personnel manning watch towers and observation posts along the DMZ. 2 3
- (c) Improvement in DMZ barrier and surveillance capability which requires additional personnel. 4 5
- (d) Rotation of a battalion from the 7th Division into the 2d Division sector to provide for additional personnel along the DMZ. 6 7 8
- (e) Increased security forces being provided around US camps and installations in the forward areas. 9 10
- (f) Quick-reaction forces available to the commanders conducting DMZ operations. 11 12
- (2) Justification for increased personnel for the above actions follows: 13 14

(a) 2d Infantry Division. The 2d Infantry Division occupies a critical portion of the main battle position and the DMZ. This division should be of sufficient strength to permit performance of its DMZ mission and to maintain a high state of readiness for its primary mission of conventional warfare. An augmentation is vitally needed to provide a greater capability for operational mission performance. The 2d US Infantry Division has been the target of the most concentrated enemy attacks, harassment, and sabotage activity and must devote much effort to combatting this threat. The many compounds (see Tab hereto) require extensive administrative support and security guards. The personnel to perform much of this support comes from the present strength of the division. 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

(b) 7th US Infantry Division. The 7th US Infantry Division is involved in supporting DMZ operations. One battalion of the 7th Division is attached to the 2d 29 30 31

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Infantry Division and is engaged in DMZ operations. This 1
was done because of increased DMZ operational requirements. 2
Use of an additional 2d Division battalion would have dis- 3
rupted rotation and training programs for 2d Infantry 4
Division units. In addition to providing one battalion for 5
DMZ operations, the 7th Infantry Division has responsi- 6
bility for counterinfiltration operations in the sector 7
adjacent to Camp Casey. 8

3. ~~SECRET~~ Group 2 - Physical Security Personnel 9

a. CINCUNC/COMUSKOREA has stated that there is a pressing 10
requirement for the augmentation of the units involved in provid- 11
ing security to special ammunition depots, maximum security areas, 12
and REDEYE storage sites. 13

b. Intelligence obtained from captured North Korean infil- 14
trators indicates that positive plans have been made by North 15
Koreans to attack isolated HERCULES sites which contain maximum 16
security areas for nuclear weapons and special ammunition depots. 17
Strengthening of the security forces at critical installations 18
is discussed below to include justification for this increased 19
operational requirement. 20

c. One and one-half infantry battalions of the US 7th Infantry 21
Division are presently diverted from their primary mission to 22
the security of these critical and sensitive installations. In 23
view of the situation on the DMZ, there is a pressing need to 24
return combat units to their primary mission. The problems in 25
providing security to these areas are detailed in the following 26
descriptions: 27

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<u>TYPE INSTALLATION/ UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>JUSTIFICATION</u>	
Special Am- munition Depots (SADs)	2 (SAD 200) (SAD 300)	Military police companies now guarding the SADs are not adequate to provide the required security. These are especially critical installations because of the concentration of munitions. The size creates heavy security requirements. The perimeters of SADs 200 and 300 are 6,000 and 5,300 yards, respectively. The two MP companies currently providing the security are augmented by US combat units of the 7th Division. A reinforced infantry platoon from the 7th Division currently is augmenting the two MP companies. Unless augmentation spaces are provided, the combat forces augmentation at both SADs must be increased. The two SADs are located at remote sites in northern part of ROK and the southern part of ROK.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Maximum Security Areas (MSA) (1/42d Arty, HJ; 1/17th Arty, 8 in; 2/76th Arty, 8 in; 3/81st Arty, Sgt)	5	The MSAs are spread throughout the ROK. Security of these critical installations is considered so critical that combat units from the 7th Infantry Division have been diverted to emergency security duty at these sites. Security is a real and overriding requirement which must be met regardless of impact on training maintenance and other normal unit activities. The heavy commitments of unit personnel to essential security duties impact heavily on operational readiness posture of these units.	21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33
Maximum Security Areas (4/44th Arty HERCULES Sites)	6	The six MSAs for NIKE-HERCULES sites are spread throughout Korea. The remote locations of many of these sites make them especially vulnerable to attack by a fast moving, well-trained North Korean commando-type unit such as they now have trained. Each HERCULES battery maintains three separate installations as follows: a launch area; an administrative area; and a fire control area. The battery sites are, in every case, isolated, and in four instances, along coastal areas are vulnerable to infiltration by sea. The assigned personnel must provide security of their installations, paying particular attention to the MSAs within the launcher site. In consideration of the vulnerability of these installations, it has been determined that a 45-man security augmentation per battery is required to provide reasonably effective protection against a determined enemy attack or attempt at sabotage. The Tab hereto is a listing of critical installations requiring personnel augmentation and data on 2d Division, 7th Division, and I Corps troop camps and compounds that require security forces.	34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61

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<u>TYPE INSTALLATION/ UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>JUSTIFICATION</u>	
REDEYE Sites	15	There are 10 sites in 2d Infantry Division, four in 7th Infantry Division, and one in I Corps Artillery. The requirements are based on number of guards deemed necessary per site. This was determined to be seven per site on a 24-hour basis (Total 105).	1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4. SECRET <u>Group 3 - Military Intelligence Personnel</u>			8
a. The 502d Military Intelligence Battalion, although designed to support only the Eighth Army, is actually providing theater-type coverage of the ROK for domestic intelligence, counterintelligence, and security. It also supports the United Nations Command and the Commander, US Forces, Korea. Current and predicted increases in North Korean agent activity have severely taxed the battalion's capability to provide proper intelligence support and all important US liaison activity with ROK intelligence and security agencies. Early augmentation is essential not only to meet the North Korean unconventional activities but to be prepared to meet the enemy's improving capability to conduct conventional warfare. Early and prompt intelligence warning is essential to afford adequate protection to those US installations which are prime targets for attack or sabotage.			9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22
b. Of equal importance for security is augmentation of the 201st, 2d, and 7th Military Intelligence detachments.			23 24
c. Military intelligence units should now be manned at 100 percent TO&E strength. KATUSA personnel cannot be used in intelligence units to replace US personnel.			25 26 27
5. SECRET <u>Group 4 - Additional Eighth Army Units</u>			28
a. I Corps troops will require augmentation. The 36th Engineer Group requires augmentation to enable it to cope effectively with the many engineer tasks engendered by the rugged Korean terrain and limited but difficult to maintain road network. The annual extremes of weather, to include the rainy season each summer,			29 30 31 32 33

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causes the main battle position and tactical roads and bridges 1
to deteriorate with an annual requirement for a heavy engineer 2
repair effort. Work in support of the DMZ barrier system is 3
extremely heavy and continuous. In the event of conventional 4
war, there would be a requirement for extensive engineer effort 5
through I Corps (Group) area. The 51st Signal Battalion does not, 6
at present, have the capability to meet adequately current signal 7
communications requirements for I Corps (Group). 8

b. The requirement for additional contingency planning and 9
current operations has taxed all headquarters to the limit of 10
their capability; they require additional personnel to insure a 11
sustained capability to function 24 hours per day. The increase 12
in North Korean activity along the DMZ and the current situation 13
in the ROK require the headquarters and staff to operate at an 14
accelerated pace on a 24-hour basis. Present personnel shortages 15
decrease the operational capability of the commands for sustained 16
operations and effective command and control of subordinate units. 17

c. Added activity, such as the buildup of ammunition which 18
has begun, will greatly increase the utilization of equipment 19
and place added demands on maintenance personnel. Drawdown on log 20
logistical units has resulted in a situation wherein logistical 21
capability of the Eighth Army must be considered marginal at best, 22
for a conventional war situation. The increased personnel for the 23
13th Supply & Services Battalion and the 55th Maintenance Battal- 24
ion will improve the logistical capability of the Eighth Army. 25

d. The additional personnel for the 38th Artillery Brigade 26
would increase its operational capability. This increase in 27
personnel would provide more missile crewmen and communications 28
personnel. This addition would also restore much of the HAWK 29
battery mobility which has also been reduced as a result of 30
austere manning levels. 31

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e. The 4th Missile Command provides nuclear support for the 1st ROK Army. This command has a high-priority mission, and its capability to perform this mission is severely reduced under current manning levels. The wide dispersion of the units, the isolated sites, and remote locations of some of the sites are particularly serious problems in view of rugged terrain and road network. The additional personnel would increase this command's operational capability.

f. The 304th Signal Battalion not only supports Headquarters, Eighth Army Support Command, but elements of Headquarters, Eighth Army, as well. This unit, under its present ceiling, is currently not capable of providing Eighth Army with adequate wartime communications. Communication facilities are not operating with maximum personnel on a 24-hour basis. This, plus the requirement to maintain vital mobile equipment for contingency purposes, has generated a requirement for personnel over current authorization.

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TAB TO ANNEX TO APPENDIX B

CRITICAL INSTALLATIONS

<u>TYPE INSTALLATION/UNIT</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>	
Special Ammunition Depot (SAD)	2	SAD 200 located vicinity	1
		Chon-Ni (CR 610315) and	2
		Anyang-Ni (CS 116956)	3
Maximum Security Area (MSA)	5	Location of the 5 MSAs are	4
		spread throughout the ROK as	5
		follows:	6
		Vic Polmal (CS 116956)	7
		Vic Pobwoni (CS 130910)	8
		Vic Chonsong-Ni (CT 368108)	9
		Vic Hason gong-Ni (CS 435538)	10
		Vic Chunchon (CS 776930)	11
4/44th Arty - Hercules Sites	6	Location of the MSAs are spread	12
		throughout ROK as follows:	13
		Vic Sason-Ni (CR 593762)	14
		Vic Nam gong-Ni (BR 795234)	15
		Vic Pyongsan-Ni (BR 569746)	16
		Vic Pondur-Ni (CS 755292)	17
		Vic Nambond-Ni (CQ 134605)	18
		Vic Chox Chon (BS 931421)	19
2d Infantry Division	96	Camps and Compounds occupies	20
		a 27 KM front and 35 KM deep.	21
7th Infantry Division	12	Camps and Compounds with one	22
		bn opcon to 2nd Div along DMZ;	23
		this division is I Corps, only	24
		reserve.	25
I Corp (GP) Troops		Camps and Compounds spread	26
		throughout I Corps area (70	27
		KM by 72 KM)	28

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